Joint Receiver and Transmitter Optimization for Energy-Efficient CDMA
  Communications by Buzzi, Stefano & Poor, H. Vincent
ar
X
iv
:0
71
2.
13
39
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
9 D
ec
 20
07
TO APPEAR ON IEEE JSAC - SPECIAL ISSUE ON MULTIUSER DETECTION FOR ADVANCED COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS 1
Joint Receiver and Transmitter Optimization for
Energy-Efficient CDMA Communications
Stefano Buzzi, Senior Member, IEEE, and H. Vincent Poor, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—This paper focuses on the cross-layer issue of joint
multiuser detection and resource allocation for energy efficiency
in wireless CDMA networks. In particular, assuming that a
linear multiuser detector is adopted in the uplink receiver, the
case considered is that in which each terminal is allowed to
vary its transmit power, spreading code, and uplink receiver
in order to maximize its own utility, which is defined as the
ratio of data throughput to transmit power. Resorting to a
game-theoretic formulation, a non-cooperative game for utility
maximization is formulated, and it is proved that a unique Nash
equilibrium exists, which, under certain conditions, is also Pareto-
optimal. Theoretical results concerning the relationship between
the problems of SINR maximization and MSE minimization are
given, and, resorting to the tools of large system analysis, a
new distributed power control algorithm is implemented, based
on very little prior information about the user of interest. The
utility profile achieved by the active users in a large CDMA
system is also computed, and, moreover, the centralized socially
optimum solution is analyzed. Considerations on the extension
of the proposed framework to a multi-cell scenario are also
briefly detailed. Simulation results confirm that the proposed non-
cooperative game largely outperforms competing alternatives,
and that it exhibits a quite small performance loss with respect
to the socially optimum solution, and only in the case in which
the users number exceeds the processing gain. Finally, results
also show an excellent agreement between the theoretical closed-
form formulas based on large system analysis and the outcome
of numerical experiments.
Index Terms—Multiuser detection, MMSE receiver, CDMA,
power control, large-system analysis, spreading code optimiza-
tion, game theory, Pareto frontier, energy efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
A SUBSTANTIAL amount of research has been carriedout on multiuser detection for code division multiple
access (CDMA) networks over the last thirty years. Start-
ing from the pioneering work of Verdu´, who derived the
optimal, minimum error probability, multiuser receiver along
with fundamental suboptimal multiuser detectors such as the
decorrelating receiver, significant progress has been made
over the years. Several relevant issues such as approximate
implementations of the optimal multiuser detector, the impact
of fading on multiuser detection structures, the synthesis of
adaptive, possibly blind, multiuser detection algorithms, and
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the joint multiuser detection and channel equalization prob-
lem, have been tackled and thoroughly investigated. Results
regarding these research issues are surveyed, among the others,
in the textbooks [1], [2]. In the recent past, a new trend
has emerged, i.e. the so-called cross-layer approach. Roughly
speaking, the basic idea here is to perform joint optimization
of procedures that are implemented in different layers of the
network protocol stack, so as to outperform solutions based
on single optimization of the procedures of each network
layer. Regarding CDMA systems, the cross layer approach has
mainly focused on the problem of integrating physical layer
issues, such as multiuser detection and channel estimation,
with network level issues, such as call admission control,
power control, and, more generally, resource allocation [3]. In
keeping with this recent trend, this paper focuses on the issue
of joint multiuser detection and resource allocation in order
to achieve energy efficiency in wireless CDMA networks.
The results of this paper are mainly based on two powerful
mathematical tools, namely game theory and large system
analysis.
Game theory [4] is a branch of mathematics that has been
applied primarily in economics and other social sciences to
study the interactions among several autonomous subjects with
contrasting interests. More recently, it has been discovered that
it can also be used for the design and analysis of communi-
cation systems, mostly with application to resource allocation
algorithms [5], and, in particular, to power control [6]. As
examples, the reader is referred to [7]–[9]. In these papers, for
a multiple access wireless data network, noncooperative and
cooperative games are introduced, wherein each user chooses
its transmit power in order to maximize its own utility, defined
as the ratio of the throughput to transmit power. While the
above papers consider the issue of power control assuming
that a conventional matched filter is available at the receiver,
the recent paper [10] considers the cross-layer problem of joint
linear receiver design and power control so as to maximize the
utility of each user: it is thus shown in [10] that the inclusion
of receiver design in the considered game brings remarkable
advantages. This same utility function is also used in [11]
for energy-efficient power control in ultra-wideband (UWB)
communications, while the survey paper [12] reviews recent
advances in the application of a game-theoretic framework for
energy-efficient resource allocation.
Large system analysis (LSA) is a relatively new mathemat-
ical tool, first introduced in [13], that has recently emerged in
the analysis of CDMA systems. In summary, [13] has revealed
that in a CDMA system with processing gain and number
of users both increasing without bound but with their ratio
fixed, and with randomly chosen, unit-norm, spreading codes,
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the Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) of each
user for the case in which a linear minimum mean square
error (MMSE) receiver is adopted converges in probability
to a non-random constant. In particular, denoting by K the
number of active users, by N the system processing gain,
by N0/2 the additive thermal noise power spectral density
(PSD) level, and by EP [·] the expectation with respect to the
limiting empirical distribution F of the received powers of the
interferers, the SINR of the MMSE receiver for the k-th user,
say γk, converges, for K,N → ∞, K/N = α = constant, in
probability to γ∗k the unique solution of the equation
γ∗k =
Pk
N0/2 + αEP
[
PPk
Pk+Pγ∗k
] , (1)
with Pk the received power for the k-th user. Interestingly,
the limiting SINR depends only on the limiting empirical
distribution of the received powers of the interferers, the load
α, the thermal noise level and the received power of the user of
interest, while being independent of the actual realization of
the received powers of the interferers and of the spreading
codes of the active users. LSA is now a well-established
mathematical tool for design and analysis of communication
systems (see, e.g., [14]–[16], to cite a few).
A. Summary of the results
This paper is the first in this area that considers the cross-
layer issue of utility maximization with respect to the choice of
linear multiuser detector, spreading code and transmit power.
Using game theory and LSA, the following contributions are
given here.
- We generalize the non-cooperative game considered in
[10] by considering utility maximization with respect to
the linear uplink multiuser receiver, transmit power and
spreading code assignment. We will show that the newly
considered non-cooperative game admits a unique Nash
equilibrium, which, for the case in which the number of
users does not exceed the system processing gain, is also
Pareto-optimal.
- As an introductory step to the previous item, we also for-
mulate a non-cooperative game for SINR maximization
with respect to linear multiuser detector and spreading
code choice, and show that this game admits a unique
Nash equilibrium point that is also Pareto-optimal.
- Using LSA, we design a new distributed power control
algorithm that needs very little prior information (i.e. the
channel gain for the user of interest) to be implemented.
This algorithm may be integrated in the utility maximiz-
ing non-cooperative game of [10].
- Using LSA, we are able to predict the utility and SINR
profile across users in a large CDMA system, for both
the cases in which spreading code optimization is either
considered or not considered.
- Using LSA, we are able to derive the socially optimum
solution to the problem of utility maximization with
equal SINR constraint; numerical results will show that
the performance loss incurred by the proposed non-
cooperative game with respect to the socially optimum
solution is quite negligible.
- We also consider the extension of our framework to a
multi-cell scenario. In particular, we consider the issue
of non-cooperative utility maximization in a multi-cell
system with predetermined base station assignment, and
show that, as the number of users does not exceeds
the processing gain, this game admits a unique Nash
equilibrium which is also Pareto-optimal.
B. Outline of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section contains some preliminaries on the considered payoff
function and on the system model of interest. Section III
dwells on the definition of Nash equilibrium and Pareto
optimality, and, also, provides an interesting result on the
equilibrium point of the SINR-maximizing non-cooperative
game. In section IV the non-cooperative game for utility
maximization with respect to the choice of linear multiuser
detection, power control and spreading code is described and
analyzed. LSA is used in Section V to derive a distributed
power control procedure that can be implemented based on
little prior information; it is shown that this algorithm may
be used to obtain distributed implementations of the non-
cooperative game proposed in [10]. In Section VI, LSA is
used in order to predict the SINR and utility profile across
users in a large CDMA system, while Section VII contains the
discussion on the socially optimum, equal SINR, cooperative
game. Section VIII considers the extension of the considered
non-cooperative games to a multi-cell scenario, wherein out-
of-cell interference is properly taken into account. Finally,
numerical results are illustrated in Section IX, while Section
X contains the eventual wrap-up of the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the uplink of a K-user synchronous, single-cell,
direct-sequence code division multiple access (DS/CDMA)
network with processing gain N and subject to flat fading.
After chip-matched filtering and sampling at the chip-rate, the
N -dimensional received data vector, say r, corresponding to
one symbol interval, can be written as
r =
K∑
k=1
√
pkhkbksk + n , (2)
wherein pk is the transmit power of the k-th user1, bk ∈
{−1, 1} is the information symbol of the k-th user, and hk is
the real2 channel gain between the k-th user’s transmitter and
the access point (AP); the actual value of hk depends on both
the distance of the k-th user’s terminal from the AP and the
channel fading fluctuations. The N -dimensional vector sk is
the spreading code of the k-th user; we assume that the entries
1To simplify subsequent notation, we assume that the transmitted power
pk subsumes also the gain of the transmit and receive antennas.
2We assume here, for simplicity, a real channel model; generalization to
practical channels, with I and Q components, is straightforward.
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of sk are real and that sTk sk = ‖sk‖2 = 1, with (·)T denoting
transpose. Finally, n is the ambient noise vector, which we
assume to be a zero-mean white Gaussian random process with
covariance matrix (N0/2)IN , with IN the identity matrix of
order N . An alternative and compact representation of (2) is
given by
r = SP 1/2Hb+ n , (3)
wherein S = [s1, . . . , sK ] is the N×K-dimensional spreading
code matrix, P and H are K × K-dimensional diagonal
matrices, whose diagonals are [p1, . . . , pK ] and [h1, . . . , hK ],
respectively, and, finally, b = [b1, . . . , bK ]T is the K-
dimensional vector of the data symbols.
Assume now that each mobile terminal sends its data in
packets of M bits, and that it is interested both in having its
data received with as small as possible error probability at
the AP, and in making careful use of the energy stored in its
battery. Obviously, these are conflicting goals, since error-free
reception may be achieved by increasing the received SNR, i.e.
by increasing the transmit power, which of course comes at the
expense of battery life3. A useful approach to quantify these
conflicting goals is to define the utility of the k-th user as the
ratio of its throughput, defined as the number of information
bits that are received with no error in unit time, to its transmit
power [7], [8], i.e.
uk =
Tk
pk
. (4)
Note that uk is measured in bit/Joule, i.e. it represents the
number of successful bit transmissions that can be made for
each Joule of energy drained from the battery. The utility
function (4) is widely accepted and indeed it has been already
used in a number of previous studies such as [7]–[12]. Of
course, there are also alternative choices that could be made.
For instance, papers [17], [18] consider an outage-based utility
suited for fast time-varying channels, while the recent study
[19] considers an utility that is the product of the transmit
power times the interference4. Utility (4), however, is by no
doubt the most suited one when energy efficiency is to be taken
into account, and from now on we will definitely embrace this
model.
Denoting by R the common rate of the network (extension
to the case in which each user transmits with its own rate Rk
is quite simple) and assuming that each packet of M symbols
contains L information symbols and M−L overhead symbols,
reserved, e.g., for channel estimation and/or parity checks, the
throughput Tk can be expressed as
Tk = R
L
M
Ek (5)
wherein Ek denotes the the probability that a packet from the
k-th user is received error-free. In the considered DS/CDMA
3Of course there are many other strategies to lower the data error prob-
ability, such as for example the use of error correcting codes, diversity
exploitation, and implementation of optimal reception techniques at the
receiver. Here, however, we are mainly interested to energy efficient data
transmission and power usage, so we consider only the effects of varying the
transmit power, the receiver and the spreading code on energy efficiency.
4Obviously in this case we are interested to utility minimization rather than
to its maximization.
setting, the term Ek depends formally on a number of pa-
rameters such as the spreading codes of all the users and the
diagonal entries of the matrices P and H , as well as on the
strength of the used error correcting codes. However, a custom-
ary approach is to model the multiple access interference as a
Gaussian random process, and assume that Ek is an increasing
function of the k-th user’s Signal-to-Interference plus Noise-
Ratio (SINR) γk, which is naturally the case in many practical
situations.
Recall that, for the case in which a linear receiver is used
to detect the data symbol bk, according, i.e., to the decision
rule
b̂k = sign
[
d
T
k r
]
, (6)
with b̂k the estimate of bk and dk the N -dimensional vector
representing the receive filter for the user k, it is easily seen
that the SINR γk can be written as
γk =
pkh
2
k(d
T
k sk)
2
N0
2 ‖dk‖2 +
∑
i6=k
pih
2
i (d
T
k si)
2
. (7)
Of related interest is also the mean square error (MSE) for the
user k, which, for a linear receiver, is defined as
MSEk = E
{(
bk − dTk r
)2}
= 1+dTkMdk−2
√
pkhkd
T
k sk ,
(8)
wherein E {·} denotes statistical expectation and M =(
SHPH
T
S
T + N02 IN
)
is the covariance matrix of the data.
The exact shape of Ek(γk) depends on factors such as the
modulation and coding type. However, in all cases of relevant
interest, it is an increasing function of γk with a sigmoidal
shape, and converges to unity as γk → +∞; as an example,
for binary phase-shift-keying (BPSK) modulation coupled with
no channel coding, it is easily shown that
Ek(γk) =
[
1−Q(√2γk)]M , (9)
with Q(·) the complementary cumulative distribution function
of a zero-mean Gaussian random variate with unit variance.
A plot of (9) is shown in Fig. 1 for the case M = 100.
It should be noted that substituting (9) into (5), and, in
turn, into (4), leads to a strong incongruence. Indeed, for
pk → 0, we have γk → 0, but Ek converges to a small but
non-zero value (i.e. 2−M ), thus implying that an unboundedly
large utility can be achieved by transmitting with zero power,
i.e. not transmitting at all and making blind guesses at the
receiver on what data were transmitted. To circumvent this
problem, a customary approach [8], [10] is to replace Ek
with an efficiency function, say fk(γk), whose behavior should
approximate as close as possible that of Ek , except that for
γk → 0 it is required that fk(γk) = o(γk). The function
f(γk) = (1 − e−γk)M is a widely accepted substitute for
the true probability of correct packet reception, and in the
following we will adopt this model5. This efficiency function is
increasing and S-shaped, converges to unity as γk approaches
5See Fig. 1 for a comparison between the probability Ek and the efficiency
function.
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infinity, and has a continuous first order derivative. Note that
we have omitted the subscript “k′′, i.e. we have used the
notation f(γk) in place of fk(γk) since we assume that the
efficiency function is the same for all the users.
Summing up, substituting (5) into (4) and replacing the
probability Ek with the above defined efficiency function, we
obtain the following expression for the k-th user’s utility:
uk = R
L
M
f(γk)
pk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (10)
Now, based on the utility definition (10), many interesting
questions arise concerning how each user may maximize its
utility, and how this maximization affects utilities achieved by
other users. Likewise, it is natural to question what happens
in a non-cooperative setting wherein each user autonomously
and selfishly tries to maximize its own utility, with no care
for other users utilities. In particular, in this latter situation,
is the system able to reach an equilibrium wherein no user is
interested in varying its parameters since each action it would
take would lead to a decrease in its own utility? And, also,
what is the price to be paid in terms of performance loss due
to the selfish behavior (i.e., lack of cooperation) of the users?
Game theory provides means to study these interactions and to
provide some useful and insightful answers to these questions.
Initially, game theory was applied in this context mainly
as a tool to study non-cooperative scenarios wherein mobile
users are allowed to vary their transmit power only (see [7]–
[9], for example) to maximize utility, and where conventional
matched filtering is used at the receiver. Recently, instead,
in [10] such an approach has been extended to the cross
layer scenario in which each user may vary its power and
its uplink linear receiver, i.e. the problem of joint linear
multiuser detection optimization and power control for utility
maximization has been tackled. In the following, we will go
further by considering and analyzing the case of spreading
code choice, power control and linear multiuser detector
design for utility maximization.
A. The proposed non-cooperative game
Formally, the game G proposed here can be described as
the triplet G = [K, {Sk} , {uk}], wherein K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}
is the set of active users participating in the game, uk is the
k-th user’s utility defined in (10), and
Sk = [0, Pk,max]×RN ×RN1 , (11)
is the set of possible actions (strategies) that user k can take.
It is seen that Sk is written as the Cartesian product of three
different sets, and indeed [0, Pk,max] is the range of available
transmit powers for the k-th user (note that Pk,max is the
maximum allowed transmit power for user k), RN , with R the
real line, defines the set of all possible linear receive filters,
and, finally,
RN1 =
{
d ∈ RN : dTd = 1
}
,
defines the set of the allowed spreading codes6 for user k.
6Here we assume that the spreading codes have real entries; the problem
of utility maximization with reasonable complexity for the case of discrete-
valued entries is a challenging issue that will be considered in the future.
Summing up, the proposed non-cooperative game to be
considered in the following can be cast as the following
maximization problem
max
Sk
uk = max
pk,dk,sk
uk(pk,dk, sk) , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (12)
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND CONCEPTS
Before proceeding further, we review here some basic
definitions on game theory, and provide some results on the
relationship between SINR maximization and MSE minimiza-
tion in multiuser systems. The content of this section will
reveal useful in the sequel of the paper.
A. Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality
We give here the definition of Nash equilibrium. Let
(s1, s2, . . . , sK) ∈ S1 × S2 × . . .SK
denote a certain strategy K-tuple for the active users. The
point (s1, s2, . . . , sK) is a Nash equilibrium if for any user k,
we have
uk(s1, . . . , sk, . . . , sK) ≥ uk(s1, . . . , s∗k, . . . , sK) ,
∀s∗k 6= sk . Otherwise stated, at a Nash equilibrium, no user
can unilaterally improve its own utility by taking a different
strategy. A fast reading of this definition might lead to think
that at Nash equilibrium users’ utilities achieve their maximum
values. Actually, this is not the case, since the existence
of a Nash equilibrium point does not imply that no other
strategy K-tuple does exist that can lead to an improvement
of the utilities of some users while not decreasing the utilities
of the remaining ones. These latter strategies are usually
said to be Pareto-optimal [4]. Otherwise stated, at a Nash
equilibrium, each user, provided that the other users’ strategies
do not change, is not interested in changing its own strategy.
However, if some sort of cooperation would be available, users
might agree to simultaneously switch to a different strategy K-
tuple, so as to improve the utility of some, if not all, active
users, while not decreasing the utility of the remaining ones.
B. SINR maximization and MSE minimization
We are now ready to state our first result.
Proposition 1: Given the linear decision rule (6) and the SINR
expression in eq. (7), consider the non-cooperative game
max
dk,sk
γk , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K , (13)
with the constraint ‖sk‖ = 1. This game admits a unique7
Nash equilibrium point, which coincides with the unique
global minimizer (with respect to spreading code choice and
linear receiver choice) of the total MSE (TMSE) defined as
TMSE =
K∑
i=1
MSEi . (14)
7Here and in the following uniqueness of the linear receive filter dk is
meant up to a positive scaling factor. Uniqueness of the spreading codes
is instead intended with respect to the set of eigenvalues of the matrix
SHPH
T
S
T
.
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Moreover, the Nash equilibrium point is also Pareto-optimal.
Proof: This proof is partly based on results that are scattered in
other papers; for the sake of conciseness and to avoid useless
reproduction of already known material, we use these results
citing their origin but without proving them again.
First of all, recall that among linear multiuser detectors, the
MMSE receiver is the one that maximizes the SINR of each
user [2], thus implying that, in order to maximize its own
SINR, each user is to adopt a linear MMSE receiver, i.e. we
have dk =
√
pkhkM
−1
sk. Substituting this last relation in eq.
(7), and using standard linear algebra techniques, it is easily
shown that
γk = pkh
2
ks
T
k
(
M − pkh2ksksTk
)−1
sk . (15)
Given eq. (15), it is seen that the k-th user SINR is maxi-
mized taking sk equal to the eigenvector corresponding to the
minimal eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of the k-th user
interference
(
M − pkh2ksksTk
)
. So far nothing guarantees that
this strategy leads to a stable equilibrium point. On the other
hand, if a linear MMSE receiver is used, the following relation
is well-known to hold
MSEk =
1
1 + γk
, (16)
thus implying that SINR maximization for the generic k-th
user is equivalent to minimization of its MSE. Moreover,
exploiting the results contained in the Appendix I of [20], it
can be shown that, in the considered setting, individual MSE
minimization is equivalent to minimization of the TMSE, de-
fined in (14). Following [21]–[23], letting D = [d1, . . . ,dK ]
and denoting by (·)+ Moore-Penrose pseudoinversion, it can
be shown that the TMSE admits a unique global optimum,
and that the iterations
di =
√
pihi
(
SHPH
T
S
T + N02 IN
)−1
si ∀i = 1, . . . ,K
si =
√
pihi
(
pih
2
iDD
T + µiIN
)+
di ∀i = 1, . . . ,K
(17)
admit as unique stable fixed points spreading code sets that are
the global minimizer of the total MSE. In the above relations,
µi should be set so that ‖si‖ = 1, and a procedure for
efficiently finding the value of µi for ensuring this constraint
is given in Appendix A.
So far, we have shown that the non-cooperative game in
(13) can be solved by minimizing, through iterations (17),
the total MSE, and that these iterations are guaranteed to
converge to the unique and stable global optimum, i.e. the
non-cooperative game admits a Nash equilibrium. It remains to
show the Pareto-optimality of this point. To this end, it suffices
to show that, letting S¯ and D¯ be the spreading code matrix
and the linear receiver matrix that jointly achieve the global
minimum of the total MSE, no strategy of spreading codes and
decoder can be found to increase the SINR of one or more
users without decreasing the SINR of at least one other user.
To see this, note that if S¯ and D¯ are the global minimizers
of the MSE, then D¯ contains the MMSE receivers resulting
from the spreading codes of S¯. Denote by
{
γi(S¯, D¯)
}K
i=1
the SINR values achieved by the matrices S¯ and D¯. Assume
now that there exists a spreading code matrix S∗ 6= S¯ such
that γi(S∗, D¯) > γi(S¯, D¯), for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
and γj(S∗, D¯) ≥ γj(S¯, D¯) for j 6= i. If this is the case,
we can make an MMSE update and obtain the matrix D∗
of the MMSE receivers corresponding to the codes in S∗.
For a given set of spreading codes, using the MMSE receiver
always yields a maximization of the SINR and a minimization
of the MSE. We thus have γi(S∗,D∗) > γi(S¯, D¯), and
γj(S
∗,D∗) ≥ γj(S¯, D¯), ∀j 6= i. Consequently, given relation
(16), we have
TMSE(S∗,D∗) < TMSE(S¯, D¯) ,
which contradicts the starting assumptions that S¯ and D¯ are
the global minimizers of the MSE.
IV. A NON-COOPERATIVE GAME FOR CROSS-LAYER
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Equipped with the above result, we are now ready to resume
the non-cooperative game in (12). Note that, given (10), the
above maximization can be also written as
max
pk,dk,sk
f(γk(pk,dk, sk))
pk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (18)
Moreover, since the efficiency function is monotone and non-
decreasing, we also have
max
pk,dk,sk
f(γk(pk,dk, sk))
pk
= max
pk
f
(
max
dk,sk
γk(pk,dk, sk)
)
pk
,
(19)
i.e. we can first take care of SINR maximization with respect
to spreading codes and linear receivers, and then focus on
maximization of the resulting utility with respect to transmit
power.
We are now ready to express our result on the non-
cooperative game for spreading code optimization, linear re-
ceiver design and power control.
Proposition 2: The non-cooperative game defined in (12)
admits a unique Nash equilibrium point (p∗k,d
∗
k, s
∗
k), for
k = 1, . . . ,K , wherein
- s
∗
k and d
∗
k are the unique k-th user spreading code and
receive filter resulting from iterations (17). Denote by γ∗k
the corresponding SINR.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the k-th user transmit
power such that the k-th user maximum SINR γ∗k equals
γ¯, i.e. the unique solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ),
with f ′(γ) the derivative of f(γ).
Moreover, for K ≤ N , the Nash equilibrium point is
Pareto-optimal.
Proof: The proof generalizes the one provided in [10], so,
for the sake of brevity, we mainly focus on its original
part. Since ∂γk/∂pk = γk/pk, it is easily seen that each
user’s utility is maximized if each user is able to achieve
the SINR γ¯, that is the unique8 solution of the equation
f(γ) = γf ′(γ). By Proposition 1, running iterations (17)
8Uniqueness of γ¯ is ensured by the fact that the efficiency function is
S-shaped [24].
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until convergence is reached provides the set of spreading
codes and MMSE receivers that maximize the SINRs for
all the users. As a consequence, the utility of each user is
maximized by adjusting transmit powers so that the optimized
(with respect to spreading codes and linear receivers) SINRs
equal γ¯. So far, we have shown how to set the transmit power,
spreading code and receiver design to maximize utility at the
Nash equilibrium. In order to shown that a Nash equilibrium
exists, we can use the same arguments of [8] and state that a
unique Nash equilibrium point exists since each user’s utility
function is quasi-concave9 in the transmit power pk and since
the efficiency function is S-shaped.
Assume now that K ≤ N ; in this case, the spreading codes
resulting from iterations (17) are orthogonal, i.e. the multiuser
channel boils down to K parallel single-user channels. As a
consequence, the SINR of each user is no longer affected by
the strategies of the other users, and maximization of the utility
of each user has no endangering effect on the utility achieved
by the other users. In this scenario, thus, the non-cooperative
game clearly achieves Pareto optimality.
In practice, the above Nash equilibrium is reached through
the following iterative algorithm. Given any set of transmit
powers, iterations (17) are run in order to minimize system
TMSE. After that, users adjust their transmit power in order to
achieve the target SINR, using, e.g., the standard power control
iterations as detailed in [6]. These steps are to be repeated until
convergence is reached.
V. A DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL ALGORITHM BASED
ON LSA
The above arguments show that implementation of the
proposed non-cooperative game, as well as of the game in
[10], needs a power control algorithm, such as the one outlined
in [6]. Classical power control algorithms require knowledge
of at least the uplink SINR for each user, or, alternatively,
are implemented through iterative procedures [25], [26] that
suffer from slow convergence and excess steady-state error.
In this paper, instead, we show that LSA may lead to power
control algorithms that may be implemented in a distributed
fashion and that require knowledge of the channel for the user
of interest only. The results of this section refer to the case
that spreading code optimization is not performed, i.e. the
case of utility maximization with respect to the choice of the
linear uplink multiuser receiver and of the transmit power is
considered.
As an introductory step to our algorithm, we begin by
illustrating a simple power control algorithm derived from
[13]. We have mentioned that in a large CDMA system the
k-th user’s SINR converges in probability to the solution to
Eq. (1). Heuristically, this means that in a large system, and
embracing the notation of the previous section, the SINR γk
is deterministic and approximately satisfies
γk ≈ h
2
kpk
N0/2 + 1
N
∑
j 6=k
h2kh
2
jpkpj
h2kpk + h
2
jpjγk
(20)
9A function is quasi-concave if there exists a point below which the function
is nondecreasing, and above which the function is nonincreasing.
Now, as noted in [13], if all the users must achieve the same
common target SINR γ¯, it is reasonable to assume that they
are to be received with the same power, i.e. the condition
h21p1 = h
2
2p2 = . . . h
2
Kpk = PR ,
is to be fulfilled. Substituting the above constraint in (20) and
equating (20) to γ¯ it is straightforward to come up with the
following relation
PR =
γ¯N0/2
1− γ¯
1 + γ¯
α
, ⇒ pk = 1
h2k
γ¯N0/2
1− γ¯
1 + γ¯
α
, (21)
wherein, we recall, α = K/N , and the relation α < 1 +
1/γ¯ must hold. Eq. (21), which derives from eq. (16) in [13],
gives a simple power control algorithm that permits setting
the transmitted power for each user based on the knowledge
of the channel gain for the user of interest only. The above
algorithm, however, does not take into account the situation
which, due to fading and path losses, some users end up in
transmitting at their maximum power without achieving the
target SINR, and indeed our numerical results to be shown in
the sequel will prove the inability of eq. (21) to predict with
good accuracy the actual power profile for the active users.
In order to circumvent this drawback, we first recall that in
[27] (see also [28]) the following result has been shown:
Lemma: Denoting by F (·) the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of the squared fading coefficients h2i , and by
[h2[1], h
2
[2], . . . , h
2
[K]] the vector of the users’ squared fading
coefficients sorted in non-increasing order, then we have
that h2[ℓ] converges, for increasing number of users K , in
probability to F−1
(
K−ℓ
K
)
, ∀ℓ = 1, . . . ,K .
The above lemma states that if we sort a large number
of identically distributed random variates, we obtain a vector
that is approximately equal to the uniformly sampled version
of the inverse of the common CDF of the random variates.
Accordingly, in a large CDMA system each user may individ-
ually build a rough estimate of the fading coefficients in the
network and be able to predict the number of users, say u2,
that possibly will end up transmitting at the maximum power.
Indeed, since, according to (21) each user is to be received
with a power PR, the estimate u2 of the number of users
transmitting at the maximum power is given by
u2 =
K∑
i=1
u
 γ¯N0/2
F−1
(
K−i
K
) (
1− α γ¯1+γ¯
) − Pmax
 , (22)
with u(·) the step-function. It is also obvious to assume that the
users transmitting at Pmax will be the ones with the smallest
channel coefficients, i.e. the squared channel gains of the users
transmitting at the maximum power are well approximated
by the samples F−1
(
K−ℓ
K
)
, with ℓ = K − u2 + 1, . . . ,K .
As a consequence, the generic k-th user will be affected by
u1 = K−u2 users that are received with power PR (these are
the u1 users with the strongest channel gains and that are able
to achieve the target SINR γ¯), and by u2 users that are received
with power PmaxF−1
(
K−ℓ
K
)
, with ℓ = K − u2 + 1, . . . ,K .
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ξi =
ψiF
−1
(
K−i
K
)
N0/2 + K − u2
N
ψiF
−1
(
K−i
K
)
Pk
ψiF−1
(
K−i
K
)
+ Pkξi
+
1
N
K∑
j=K−u2+1,j 6=i
ψiF
−1
(
K−i
K
)
PmaxF
−1
(
K−j
K
)
ψiF−1
(
K−i
K
)
+ PmaxF−1
(
K−j
K
)
ξi
. (28)
Denoting by Pk the received power for the k-th user, Eq. (20)
can be now written as
γk =
NPk
NN0
2
+
u1PkPR
Pk + PRγk
+
K∑
i=K−u2+1
PkPmaxF
−1
(
K−i
K
)
Pk + PmaxF−1
(
K−i
K
)
γk
.
(23)
Now, assuming for the moment that user k is able to achieve
its target SINR, i.e. that Pk = PR, the second summand at
the denominator on the RHS of the above equation can be
approximated as
PkPR
Pk + PRγk
≈ Pk
1 + γk
. (24)
Substituting the above approximations into (23) and equating
it to the target SINR γ¯ we have
NPk
NN0
2
+
u1Pk
1 + γ¯
+
K∑
i=K−u2+1
PkPmaxF
−1
(
K−i
K
)
Pk + PmaxF−1
(
K−i
K
)
γ¯
= γ¯ .
(25)
The above relation can be now numerically solved in order to
determine the receive power Pk for the k-th user10; the actual
transmit power for the k-th user is finally set according to the
rule
pk = min
{
Pk/h
2
k, Pmax
} (26)
Summing up, the proposed algorithm may be summarized
as follows. First, the number of users transmitting at the
maximum power is estimated according to (22). Then, the
desired receive power for each user is computed solving eq.
(25). Finally, the transmit power for the k-th user is determined
according to relation (26). Note that this algorithm requires
knowledge only of the channel gain for the user of interest. In
Appendix B we will briefly sketch a method to compute the
inverse of the CDF of the channel gains taking into account
both fading and path losses due to random users’ location with
respect to the AP.
VI. NETWORK PERFORMANCE PREDICTION IN A LARGE
CDMA SYSTEM
In this section we show how LSA arguments can be used
to derive the utility, transmit power and achieved SINR profile
across users in a large CDMA system. Otherwise stated, we
show here that, based on the knowledge of the parameters K
and N , an estimate of the performance enjoyed by the ensem-
ble of the users can be obtained. We begin by considering the
case in which no spreading code optimization is used, and,
then, we will relax this constraint.
10Actually this equation gives the desired receive power for each user, and
thus in a centralized power control algorithm needs to be solved just once.
A. Power control and linear MMSE detection
Assume that no spreading code optimization is performed
and that an MMSE linear multiuser detector is used at the
receiver. Eq. (26) provides the transmit power of the k-th user,
wherein Pk is the solution of eq. (25), and h2k is the square
of the channel coefficient for the k-th user. Once equation
(25) has been solved (note that this equation is to be solved
just once), the set P of the transmitted powers by the active
terminals is expressed as
P =
{
min
(
Pk/F
−1
(
K − ℓ
K
)
, Pmax
)}K
ℓ=1
. (27)
With regard to the set of the achieved SINRs, we have already
commented on the fact that K−u2 users are able to achieve the
target SINR γ¯. Denoting by ξi the SINR achieved by the user
whose channel coefficient is h[i], and letting ψi denote the i-th
element of the set P (i.e. ψi = min
(
Pk/F
−1
(
K−i
K
)
, Pmax
)),
it is easily shown that ξi can be approximately obtained
as the solution to Eq. (28), shown at the top of this page.
Accordingly, the set of the achieved SINRs in the network will
contain K−u2 elements equal to γ¯ and u2 elements given by
the solution to the above equation with i = K−u2+1, . . . ,K .
Given the set of transmit powers and of achieved SINRs, the
set of achieved utilities will contain the elements
υi = R
L
M
f(ξi)
ψi
, i = 1, . . . ,K . (29)
B. Joint transmitter and receiver optimization with K ≤ N
Let us consider now the case that joint power control,
spreading code optimization and linear receiver design is
performed so as to maximize each user’s utility. In this case,
iterations (17) converge to a set of orthogonal codes, thus
implying that the multiple-access channel boils down to the
superposition of K parallel single-user channels. In this case,
the k-th user SINR γk is expressed as
γk =
pkh
2
k
N0/2 , k = 1, . . . ,K . (30)
As a consequence, since each user should achieve a target
SINR γ¯, we have that the set P of the transmitted powers is
expressed as
P =
{
min
(
γ¯N0/2
F−1
(
K−i
K
) , Pmax
)}K
i=1
(31)
Accordingly, denoting by {ξi}Ki=1 the set of the achieved
SINRs, we have
ξi =
ψiF
−1
(
K−i
K
)
N0/2 , i = 1, . . . ,K (32)
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with ψi = min
(
γ¯N0/2
F−1
(
K−i
K
) , Pmax
)
the generic element of
P . Given ξi and ψi, the ensemble of achieved utilities can be
computed as in (29).
C. Joint transmitter and receiver optimization with K > N
Consider finally the case of an oversaturated CDMA system,
i.e. the number of active users is larger than the processing
gain. The following analysis refers to the case in which each
user is able to achieve the target SINR γ¯; it is thus reasonable
to assume that all the users are received with the same power,
i.e.
p1h
2
1 = . . . = pKh
2
K = PR . (33)
Since a linear MMSE detector is used at the receiver, using
standard linear algebra it is easily shown that the k-th user
SINR can be expressed as
γk = γ¯ =
pkh
2
ks
T
kM
−1
sk
1− pkh2ksTkM−1sk
=
PRs
T
kM
−1
sk
1− PRsTkM−1sk
. (34)
On the other hand, it is well known [21], [22], [29] that in
the case in which K > N and all the users are received with
the same power, iterations (17) converge to a set of Welch-
Bound-Equality (WBE) sequences, i.e. the limiting sequences
are such that
SHPH
T
S
T = PRαIN , (35)
where, we recall, α = K/N . As a consequence, the data
covariance matrix is expressed as
M =
(
PRα+
N0
2
)
IN . (36)
Substituting eq. (36) into (34) and solving for PR we have
PR =
γ¯N0/2
1 + γ¯(1− α) , (37)
with α < 1+1/γ¯. Once PR has been computed from (37), the
elements of the set of the transmitted powers are expressed as
ψi =
PR
F−1
(
K−i
K
) , (38)
and the elements of the set of the achieved utilities can be
computed as in (29), with ξi = γ¯, ∀i = 1, . . . ,K .
VII. SOCIALLY OPTIMUM SOLUTION IN THE
OVERSATURATED SCENARIO
Proposition 2 has shown that the Nash equilibrium of the
proposed non-cooperative game is also Pareto-optimal in the
case in which K ≤ N . For K > N , instead, the resource
allocation strategy resulting from the said game is not on the
Pareto-optimal frontier; the question thus arises on how much
is the Nash equilibrium point far from the optimal frontier.
Usually, the Pareto-optimal frontier cannot be easily computed,
and an alternative and viable approach is to consider the
following social problem
max
S1,...,SK
K∑
i=1
ui , (39)
subject to the constraint of equal SINR, i.e. γ1 = . . . = γK =
γ, so that fairness among users can be ensured. The above
problem can be thus written as
max
S1,...,SK
K∑
i=1
ui = max
p1,...,pK
K∑
i=1
1
pi
max
s1, . . . , sk
c1, . . . , ck
f(γ) , (40)
with γ the common output SINR. Now, given the condition
of equal SINR across users, it is natural to assume that the
received powers are the same for all the users, i.e. eq. (33)
holds. Assuming that the optimal transmit power for all the
users are smaller than Pmax, from eq. (33) we have pi =
PR/h
2
i , thus implying that the social problem becomes
max
PR
1
PR
max
s1, . . . , sk
c1, . . . , ck
f(γ)
K∑
i=1
h2i =
max
PR
1
PR
f
 max
s1, . . . , sk
c1, . . . , ck
γ
 K∑
i=1
h2i .
(41)
Since the received powers are the same for all the users,
according to [21], [29], iterations (17) converge to a set
of WBE sequences, which minimize the TMSE and, conse-
quently, maximize the common SINR. Maximization of the
common SINR with respect to the spreading codes and linear
receivers of all the users can be thus carried out using iterations
(17) after that the condition (33) has been imposed. Let us
denote by γ∗ the corresponding maximum common SINR; γ∗
is thus the SINR achieved by each user in a CDMA system
wherein the spreading codes are WBE sequences, the receivers
are MMSE detectors and each user is received with power PR.
Accordingly, we have
γ∗ =
PRs
T
kM
−1
sk
1− PRsTkM−1sk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K (42)
Using eq. (36), we obtain, after some algebra
PR =
γ∗N0/2
1− γ∗(α− 1) , α < 1 +
1
γ∗
(43)
Substituting the above relation into eq. (41) the socially
optimum problem is finally written as
max
γ
f(γ)
γN0/2 [1− γ(α− 1)] . (44)
Taking the first order derivative of the above function with
respect to γ we have
γf ′(γ) [1− γ(α− 1)] = f(γ) . (45)
The solution of this equation represents the utility-maximizing
target SINR for each user in a social optimum context.
VIII. EXTENSIONS TO THE MULTI-CELL SCENARIO
So far, we have considered the uplink of a single-cell
scenario, i.e. out-of-cell interference has been either neglected
or included in the additive thermal noise. However, real
wireless networks are usually multi-cell, and users’ utilities
are affected also by the strategies of out-of-cell interference
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[30]. In what follows, we thus give a brief look at the multi-
cell case showing how the results of the previous sections may
be extended to this case, pointing out some differences with
the single-cell scenario, and revealing some interesting open
issues for future investigations.
Let us thus consider the uplink of a multi-cell DS/CDMA
wireless data network. Denote by B the number of access
points, and let hi,j be the real channel between the j-th user
and the i-th AP; moreover, denote by a(j) the index of the AP
assigned to the j-th user11. After chip-matched filtering and
chip-rate sampling, the N -dimensional received data vector at
the ℓ-th AP, say rℓ, is written as
rℓ =
K∑
k=1
√
pkhℓ,kbksk + nℓ , ℓ = 1, . . . , B . (46)
The generic k-th user data is thus decoded at the a(k)-th AP,
based on the decision rule
b̂k = sgn
[
d
T
k ra(k)
]
, (47)
and the k-th user utility is now expressed as
uk = R
L
M
f(γa(k),k)
pk
, (48)
where, here, γa(k),k is the k-th user SINR at the output of its
linear receiver in its assigned AP, and is expressed as
γa(k),k =
pkh
2
a(k),k(d
T
k sk)
2
N0
2 ‖dk‖2 +
∑
j 6=k
pjh
2
a(k),j(d
T
k sj)
2
. (49)
Of related interest is also the k-th user MSE achieved by the
detection rule (47); it is easy to show that it is expressed as
MSEk = 1 + d
T
kMa(k)dk − 2
√
pkha(k),kd
T
k sk , (50)
with Ma(k) =
K∑
m=1
pmh
2
a(k),msms
T
m+
N0
2
IN the covariance
matrix of the data received that the a(k)-th AP.
Based on the above definitions, non-cooperative games for
energy-efficient resource allocation can be considered in a
multi-cell setting. Leaving aside for the moment the issue of
spreading code allocation, the following result holds.
Proposition 3: Consider a non-cooperative game wherein the
k-th user utility (48) is maximized with respect to the choice of
the transmit power pk ∈ [0, Pk,max] and of the linear receiver
dk ∈ RN . A unique Nash equilibrium point (p∗k,d∗k) for k =
1, . . . ,K , exists, wherein
- d
∗
k is the vector corresponding to a linear MMSE re-
ceiver;
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the k-th user transmit
power such that the k-th user SINR γa(k),k equals γ¯, i.e.
the unique solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ), with
f ′(γ) the derivative of f(γ).
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines of that of
Proposition 2 and is omitted for the sake of brevity.
11Note that we are assuming here that each user is assigned to a certain
AP, i.e. AP assignments have already taken place.
The above result states that, if transmit power and linear
receiver are to be allocated, a unique Nash-equilibrium point
does exist also in a multi-cell system. Unfortunately, things
are more involved as optimization with respect to spreading
codes too comes into play. If the total number K of users in
the network does not exceed the system processing gain N ,
then the following result holds.
Proposition 4: Consider a non-cooperative game wherein
the k-th user utility (48) is maximized with respect to the
choice of the transmit power pk ∈ [0, Pk,max], of the linear
receiver dk ∈ RN and of the spreading code sk ∈ RN1 ;
assume that K ≤ N . A Nash equilibrium point (p∗k,d∗k, s∗k)
for k = 1, . . . ,K , exists, wherein
- s
∗
k and d
∗
k are the k-th user spreading code and receive
filter minimizing the total MSE and can be obtained as
fixed points of the iterations
dk =
√
pkha(k),kM
−1
a(k)sk , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K ,
sk = dk/‖dk‖ , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K .
(51)
Denote by γ∗k the corresponding SINR.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the k-th user transmit
power such that the k-th user maximum SINR γ∗k equals
γ¯, i.e. the unique solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ),
with f ′(γ) the derivative of f(γ).
This Nash equilibrium point is Pareto-optimal.
Proof: The proof is omitted for the sake of brevity.
Basically, the above result states that if K ≤ N a Nash
equilibrium point does exist which is also Pareto-optimal;
this point corresponds to the global minimum of the total
MSE, which is a fixed point of iterations (51). However,
further investigation is needed to establish if other Nash
equilibria may exist and, also, if iterations (51) have some
other fixed points corresponding to local minima of the total
MSE. Likewise, the case in which K > N , which is the most
relevant one in a multi-cell network, also merits some further
investigation. These tasks are however beyond the scope of this
paper, and a thorough investigation of the multi-cell scenario,
which is certainly worthwhile, is left for future work.
IX. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we illustrate some simulation results that give
insight into the performance of the proposed non-cooperative
games, and, also, corroborate the validity of the analytical
results of the previous sections.
We consider an uplink DS/CDMA system with processing
gain N = 16, and assume that the packet length is M = 120;
for this value of M the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ) can be
shown to admit the solution γ¯ = 6.689 = 8.25dB. A single-
cell system is considered, wherein users may have random
positions with a distance from the AP ranging from 10m to
1000m. The channel coefficient hk for the generic k-th user is
assumed to be Rayleigh distributed with mean equal to d−1k ,
with dk being the distance of user k from the AP. We take
the ambient noise level to be N0 = 10−9W/Hz, while the
maximum allowed power Pk,max is −25dBW. We present the
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results of averaging over 10000 independent realizations for
the users locations, fading channel coefficients and starting
set of spreading codes. More precisely, for each iteration we
randomly generate an N × K-dimensional spreading code
matrix with entries in the set
{
−1/√N, 1/√N
}
; this matrix
is then used as the starting point for the games that include
spreading code optimization, and as the spreading code matrix
for the games that do not perform spreading code optimization.
Figs. 2 - 4 report the achieved average utility (measured in
bits/Joule), the average user transmit power and the average
achieved SINR at the receiver output versus the number of
users, for the game in [10], the game in [8] and for the
non-cooperative game considered in Section IV of this paper.
Inspecting the curves, it is seen that the proposed approach
largely outperforms the games of [8], [10]. As an example, it is
seen that for K = 10 users the utility achieved by the proposed
game is about twice that achieved by the game in [10], i.e.
the same amount of energy can be used to transmit a doubled
bulk of data. In particular, it is seen that for K ≤ N a very
substantial performance gain can be obtained by resorting to
spreading code optimization; indeed, when K ≤ N , users can
be given orthogonal spreading codes, so that the multiaccess
channel reduces to a superposition of K separate single-user
AWGN channels. It is also seen from Fig. 4 that receivers
achieve on the average an output SINR that is smaller than
the target SINR γ¯: indeed, due to fading and distance path
losses, achieving the target SINR would require for some users
a transmit power larger than the maximum allowed power
Pk,max, and so these users are not able to achieve the optimal
target SINR. As a confirmation of this, in Fig. 5 we report
the fraction of users transmitting at the maximum power: as
expected, the smaller fraction corresponds to the proposed
game, but it is seen that this fraction is larger than zero.
In order to validate the LSA-based distributed power control
algorithm of Section V, we consider a system with processing
gain N = 128. Fig. 6 reports the transmitted power profile
across users for the proposed distributed power control algo-
rithm, for the algorithm derived by Eq. (16) in [13] (i.e. eq.
(21)), and for the conventional power control algorithm of [6],
that is non-adaptive and requires a substantial amount of prior
information. It is seen that the proposed algorithm is capable
of reproducing the optimal power profile with very good
accuracy, while, on the contrary, the algorithm descending
from paper [13] overestimates the required transmit powers
and does not achieve a good performance. While Fig. 6 shows
the result of just one simulation trial (note however that a
similar behavior has been observed in any considered case)
the subsequent three figures report results coming from an
average over 1000 independent realizations of the spreading
codes, channel coefficients and users’ locations. Figs. 7 - 9
show the achieved average utility (measured in bits/Joule), the
average user transmit power and the average achieved SINR
at the receiver output versus the number of active users, for
the conventional power control algorithms (i.e. for the non-
cooperative game of [10]), for the proposed algorithm, and
for the power control algorithm derived by paper [13]. Results
show that the proposed algorithm achieves a performance
level practically indistinguishable from that of the standard
algorithm, while the algorithm (21) achieves an utility much
smaller. From Fig. 9 it is however seen that the algorithm
(21) achieves an output SINR larger than that of the other
algorithms: this should not be interpreted as a sign of good
performance. Indeed, in the considered scenario the aim of
the power control algorithm is to make each user operate at a
SINR equal to γ¯.
Finally, we consider an oversaturated system with process-
ing gain N = 64, and number of users K = 70, so that
K > N . In Fig. 10 we report the utility profile across
users for the non-cooperative game proposed in Section IV,
in comparison with the utility profile predicted according
to the content of Section VI.C and with the utility profile
corresponding to the socially optimum solution with equal
SINR constraint. It is seen that the performance loss incurred
by the non-cooperative game in comparison with the socially
optimum solution is quite negligible, and, also, that the LSA-
based profile follows with good accuracy the actual utility
profile. As a consequence, this plot corroborates the validity
of our asymptotic analysis, that it is seen to be useful also
when the system is actually “not so large”.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper the cross-layer issue of joint multiuser de-
tection, power control, and spreading code optimization for
wireless data networks has been addressed. First of all, build-
ing on the study [10], we have proposed a more general non-
cooperative game wherein also spreading code optimization
can be used to further increase the energy efficiency of
CDMA-based wireless networks. We have shown that this
game admits a unique Nash equilibrium point, that, for un-
saturated systems, is also Pareto-optimal. For oversaturated
CDMA systems, instead, we have shown that the socially
optimum solution with equal SINR constraint exhibits a per-
formance level practically coincident with that of the proposed
non-cooperative game. Using LSA, and assuming that no
spreading code optimization is performed, a new distributed
power control algorithm that can be implemented based on the
knowledge of the channel for the user of interest only has been
proposed. Additionally, through LSA results we have been able
to derive the network utility profile for a large CDMA system,
for both the cases that either spreading code optimization is
carried out or it is not. Moreover, as an introductory step
to the proposed non-cooperative game, we have clarified the
relationship between the problems of SINR maximization and
TMSE minimization in a synchronous CDMA system. Finally,
we have also given a brief look at the multi-cell scenario, and,
while extending some of our results to this case too, we have
highlighted open issues worth being investigated in a future
work. Numerical results have confirmed the superiority of
the proposed non-cooperative game with respect to competing
alternatives, as well as that the LSA-based theoretical formulas
describe with good accuracy the actual network performance.
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APPENDIX A
Given the relation
sk =
√
pkhk
(
pkh
2
kDD
T + µkIN
)+
dk ,
we show here how to choose the constant µk so that ‖sk‖ =
1. Let UΛUT be the eigendecomposition of the matrix
pkh
2
kDD
T
. Obviously, U is an orthonormal matrix whose
columns are the eigenvectors of pkh2kDD
T
, and Λ is the
corresponding diagonal eigenvalue matrix. Note that some of
these eigenvalue will be zero for K < N . Now, letting ui and
λi denote the i-th column of U and the i-th diagonal element
of Λ, respectively, and
z(λi, µk) =
 1λi+µk if λi + µk 6= 00 if λi + µk = 0 , (52)
it is easy to show that the above spreading code update can
be rewritten as
sk =
√
pk
N∑
i=1
z(λi, µk)uiu
T
i dk . (53)
From (53) it is seen that, as µk → +∞, ‖sk‖ → 0, thus
implying that there exists a finite constant Qu such that
‖sk‖ < 1 for any µk ≥ Qu. Now, let λm = mini λi (note
that λm may be 0 if K < N or in general if DDT is not of
full rank). It is easy to show that, as µk → λ+m, ‖sk‖ → +∞.
Accordingly, there exists a finite constant Ql > λm such that
‖sk‖ > 1 for µk ∈]λm, Ql]. Since ‖sk‖ is monotonically
decreasing for µk ∈ [Ql, Qu] and since ‖sk‖ > 1 for µk = Ql
and ‖sk‖ < 1 for µk = Qu, there exists just one value of µk,
say µ∗k, such that ‖sk‖ = 1 for µk = µ∗k. The value of µ∗k can
be found using standard methods.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix we show how the inverse CDF of the fading
coefficients can be computed. In order to account for both
fading and path loss, we assume that h2k is given by the ratio
of two random variables, i.e. h2k =
α2k
dnk
, wherein αk is an
exponential random variable (this corresponds to considering
a Rayleigh fading channel), while dk is the distance of the k-th
user from the BS; we assume that dk is uniformly distributed
in the interval [Ra, Rb]; typical values may be Ra = 10m and
Rb = 500m. Finally n is a non-random exponent; in urban
environments n is usually taken in the interval [2, 5]. It is easy
to show that the CDF of h2k is given by
Fh2
k
(x) = Prob
(
h2k ≤ x
)
= Edk
[
1− e−xdnk
]
(54)
For the case n = 2, straightforward computations lead to
Fh2
k
(x) = 1− 1
Rb −Ra
√
π
x
[
1
2
erfc(Ra
√
x)− 1
2
erfc(Rb
√
x)
]
,
(55)
where erfc(·) is the complementary error function. The above
equation should now be inverted numerically in order to
obtain the inverse CDF. However, such an inversion may
be computationally demanding, and, moreover, closed form
expressions for the case n 6= 2 are not available.
An effective alternative approach is the following. The
interval [Ra, Rb] can be partitioned in a given number, say
P , of smaller intervals, and the probability density function of
dk can be approximated as
fdk(d) ≈
1
P
P∑
i=1
δ(d−Ra − i∆) , with ∆ = Rb −Ra
P
.
(56)
As a consequence, we have
Fh2
k
(x) ≈ 1− 1
P
P∑
i=1
e−xd
n
i , (57)
with di = Ra + i∆. Equation (57) is numerically invertible.
Indeed, upon letting e−x = z, we have
1− 1
P
P∑
i=1
zd
n
i = y ⇒
P∑
i=1
zd
n
i = (1− y)P . (58)
It is easy to see that the above equation admits a unique
solution z > 0, and any standard numerical equation solver
routine can be used to find it; after that, we have x = − ln(z),
and this equals F−1
h2
k
(y).
In our simulations we have assumed Ra = 10m, Rb =
1000m and P = 200.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of probability of error-free packet reception and efficiency function versus receive SINR and for packet size M = 100. Note the S-shape
of both functions.
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Fig. 2. Achieved average utility versus number of active users for the proposed noncooperative game and for the games in references [8] and [10]. The
system processing gain is N = 15.
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Fig. 3. Average transmit power versus number of active users for the proposed noncooperative game and for the game in references [8] and [10]. The system
processing gain is N = 15.
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Fig. 4. Achieved average output SINR versus number of active users for the proposed noncooperative game and for the game in references [8] and [10].
The system processing gain is N = 15.
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Fig. 5. Average fraction of users transmitting at their maximum allowed power versus number of active users for the proposed noncooperative game and for
the game in references [8] and [10]. The system processing gain is N = 15.
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Fig. 6. Transmitted power profile across users for the proposed distributed algorithm based on LSA, the conventional power control algorithm [6] and the
profile derived according to the algorithm in [13].
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Fig. 7. Average utility versus number of users for the proposed distributed algorithm based on LSA, for the centralized implementation of reference [10]
and for the distributed algorithm based on the power control algorithm of reference [13].
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Fig. 8. Average transmit power versus number of users for the proposed distributed algorithm based on LSA, for the centralized implementation of reference
[10] and for the distributed algorithm based on the power control algorithm of reference [13].
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Fig. 9. Average achieved SINR versus number of users for the proposed distributed algorithm based on LSA, for the centralized implementation of reference
[10] and for the distributed algorithm based on the power control algorithm of reference [13].
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Fig. 10. Utility profile for the proposed non-cooperative game, in comparison with the social optimum and with the utility profile predicted by large system
analysis. Here the processing gain is N = 64 and the number of users is K = 70.
